THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF GENETICALLY MODIFIED ORGANISMS IN SMALL DEVELOPING COUNTRIES by Hareau, Guy Gaston et al.
The Economic Impact of Genetically Modified Organisms in Small Developing Countries 
 
Guy G. Hareau
a, Bradford F. Mills




Paper prepared for presentation at the Annual Meeting of the American Agricultural Economics 
Association 
Long Beach, CA, July 28-31, 2002 
Series: Selected Paper 
Date: May 2002 
 
208 Hutcheson Hall, Virginia Tech, Blacksburg, Virginia 24061 





Copyright 2002 by Guy G. Hareau, Bradford F. Mills, George W. Norton and Darrell Bosch. All 
rights reserved. Readers may make verbatim copies of this document for non-commercial 
purposes by any means, provided that this copyright notice appears on all such copies. 
                                                 
a Researcher, Instituto Nacional de Investigación Agropecuaria (INIA, Uruguay) and Graduate Student, Department 
of Agricultural and Applied Economics, College of Agriculture and Life Sciences, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and 
State University. 
b Associate Professor at the Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics, College of Agriculture and Life 
Sciences, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University. 
c Professors at the Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics, College of Agriculture and Life Sciences, 
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University. 
The authors wish to acknowledge to Gonzalo Zorrilla, Head of the Rice Research Program at the National 
Agriculture Research Institute (INIA) of Uruguay, his collaboration in providing key expert opinion for this study. 
 ABSTRACT 
 
  The expected benefits from herbicide resistant transgenic rice in Uruguay are estimated 
with stochastic simulation techniques. Economic surplus methods that account for private profits 
are used to measure the magnitude and distribution of the benefits between producers and a 
multinational firm. Further, the adoption rate of transgenic rice is endogenous in the model and 
depends on the expected profitability of the technology. The results show that the potential 
benefits from the technology are relatively small because of the small production base. 
Multinational firms are, therefore, unlikely to develop locally adapted transgenic rice varieties 
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 2Introduction 
The biotechnology science developed during the past decade has given rise to new 
agricultural technologies based on the manipulation of individual genes. The new products are 
usually known as Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs) or transgenic organisms. High 
invention costs and the need for a high degree of specialization have concentrated their 
development within large multinational biotechnology companies, which are entitled to 
intellectual property rights (IPR) over the innovation to recover the research investments. While 
this conferred monopoly power acts as an incentive for the creation of the new technologies, it 
also affects the distribution of the benefits derived from adoption of GMOs. 
Weak enforcement of IPR has until now resulted in the concentration of the adoption of 
GMOs in developed countries. Moreover, high fixed costs in developing biotechnology research 
capacity make it economically difficult for agricultural research systems in small developing 
countries, such as Uruguay, to develop locally adapted GMOs on their own. Relying on GMOs 
developed by multinational corporations, on the other hand, raises concerns that multinational 
monopolists may price GMOs to leave few benefits for country producers. In small developing 
countries, appropriate national strategies are needed to maximize the domestic benefits of 
GMOs, while leaving sufficient incentives for multinationals to partner in technology generation. 
This paper presents an ex-ante evaluation of the size and distribution of the economic 
benefits from introducing a herbicide resistant genetically modified rice variety in Uruguay. 
Improved estimates of the potential benefits of GMOs will help inform agricultural research 
organizations in small countries like Uruguay to develop feasible policies to retain a greater 
share of the benefits from GMOs. A partial equilibrium framework is developed that accounts 
for the market power in transgenic seed of a multinational GMO owner. Economic surplus 
 3methods are used to measure the total benefits and their distribution between producers and the 
multinational firm. The benefits from transgenic varieties are estimated with stochastic 
simulation techniques that account for uncertainty in some key model parameters. Unlike most 
previous studies of technology impact, the adoption levels of GMOs are also directly linked to 
the per-unit cost reduction associated with the technology. The results indicate the total expected 
benefits from the introduction of the new variety are 10.4 million dollars. Benefits to Uruguay 
amount to 8.1 million dollars and the GMO owner receives 2.3 million dollars. By contrast, total 
benefits produced when a perfectly competitive market for the transgenic seed is simulated 
amount to 20.8 million dollars, all accruing to the country’s rice producers. 
Three important implications are drawn from the simulations. First, the total benefits 
generated by GMOs decrease with the seed markup charged by the monopolist. As the 
monopolist increases the level of the seed premium, producer profits are reduced and adoption 
rates decline.  Producer benefits within the country are, therefore, reduced.  Correspondingly, the 
profit maximizing seed mark-up for the multinational firm results in a lower than optimal level 
of technology adoption in the country. Second, a small market for varieties can significantly 
restrict attempts by the country to use license fees to recover, and redistribute back to producers 
and consumers, some of the profits captured by multinationals. Model estimates indicate that in a 
small country like Uruguay, the profits available to the multinational gene owner are small, 
leaving little room for redistribution of these profits before the multinational will choose not to 
sell the gene in the country. Third, given the limits on potential tax and tariff policies imposed on 
the country by small production base, agricultural research systems in small countries need to 
examine alternative cost and benefit sharing arrangements with multinational gene owners.  
Potential arrangements include shared licensing of genes introduced into locally adapted 
 4germplasm and regional licenses that spread multinational’s fixed costs over a larger market 
area. 
 
The Economic Surplus Model with Market Imperfection 
Procedures and methods for analyzing the economic impact of agricultural technologies 
are well-established (see for example, Alston, Norton and Pardey, 1995). While different authors 
have followed different approaches, the measurement of the change in economic surplus 
generated after the adoption of the new technology is cited as one of the most accepted and often 
used methods. The method, however, is dependent on some strong assumptions with respect to 
the form of the supply functions and the nature of income effects and other parameters. On the 
other hand, most of the data required is generally available or can be easily generated. 
Moschini and Lapan (1997) argue that the presence of Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) 
in agricultural innovations modifies the theoretical framework and assumptions of the 
conventional economic surplus approach. The reasoning is based on the fact that IPR confer 
limited monopoly power to firms producing the innovation. Since these innovations are in 
general embedded in the inputs, the common assumption of perfect competition in seed input 
market does not hold in this case. Rather, the firm producing the innovation sets its price to 
maximize private profit based on monopoly power. This monopoly profit needs to be accounted 
for when evaluating the welfare change after an agricultural innovation protected by IPR is 
adopted. 
Since the economic surplus approach is usually focused on the commodity market, while 
the monopolist’s profit is generated in the input market, the adjusted model proposed by 
Moschini and Lapan evaluates the total welfare change as the sum of the change in the 
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present study follows a similar approach to assess ex-ante the impact of herbicide resistant 
transgenic rice in Uruguay. Since rice is mainly grown for export, the empirical model applies 
the formulae in Alston, Norton and Pardey for a small open economy, adding the calculation of 
the monopolist’s profit as the product of the seed premium and the adoption area. The model is 
as follows: 
Change Total Surplus = Change Producer Surplus + Monopolist’s Profit 
Change in Producer Surplus = Pw Q0 K (1+ 0.5 Kε) 
Monopolist’s Profit = µ * At 
 
Pw: world  price 
Q0: pre-research  quantity 
K:  technical change, shift of the supply curve as a proportion of the initial price 
ε: supply  elasticity 
µ: seed  markup 
At:  rate of adoption of the new technology 
 
The coefficient for the technical change K can be calculated from the following formula: 
 
K =  E (Y)    _   E (C)        p At (1 - dt ) 
   ε      1 + E (Y) 
 
E (Y):  expected increase in yield per hectare after the adoption of the new technology 
E (C):  proportionate change in variable input costs per hectare 
ε: supply  elasticity 
p:  probability of success of research in achieving the expected change in yield 
dt:  depreciation factor for the new technology 
 
 6Uncertainty in Parameter Estimates 
The literature on economic surplus analysis applied to the evaluation of agricultural 
technologies has also been characterized by the use of deterministic values for uncertain 
variables. Sensitivity analysis is then used to create alternative scenarios for the economic impact 
of the technology. While the type of results generated is useful to estimate the direction of 
changes in economic surplus due to the innovation, they do not account for probability 
distributions of key parameters. Estimating the benefits derived from the introduction of Bt 
Cotton in the United States, Falck-Zepeda, Traxler and Nelson (2000) cite previous works to 
propose, “stochastic simulation should be used to replace sensitivity analysis in equilibrium 
displacement models”. Further, ex-ante parameters embody more uncertainty than ex-post 
parameters since events have not happened yet. Probably the best example is the expected 
adoption area of a new agricultural technology, which is highly unknown in ex-ante evaluations 
but largely deterministic in ex-post studies. A certain degree of technological uncertainty is also 
present when farmers adopt a new technology for the first time. In the case of biotechnologies, 
however, this uncertainty seems to be higher because the genetically modified varieties are often 
viewed as having a higher degree of risk than more traditional varieties (Saha, Love and 
Schwart, 1994). As a result, the expected adoption rate, given an expected increase in yield, is 
likely lower for biotechnologies. Other sources of uncertainty are related to measurement error in 
market data and natural uncertainty arising from yield variability. 
Parameter uncertainty is best represented through probability distributions rather than 
deterministic values. The equations of the model developed above indicate the type of data 
needed for the evaluation. The following variables are assigned probabilistic values: expected 
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price, maximum adoption rate, and price elasticity of supply. 
Another important issue is how to model the uncertainty over the 15-year period of the 
analysis. Two variables are assumed to be random events every year: price and expected increase 
in yield. Thus, they are modeled as having probabilistic distributions over the period and in each 
year they can take different values. Other variables, however, are assumed fixed once the first 
year event has occurred. It is rational to assume that per-unit cost reductions associated with the 
technology are fixed on average and, thus, farmers would expect to achieve the same cost 
reduction each year. The seed markup is also assumed fixed after the first contract has been 
established
1. The value for the long-run elasticity of supply is determined on the first year and 
also remains constant over the rest of the period. The maximum expected adoption rate is 
determined by the first year’s per-unit cost reduction value, and then calculated for the rest of the 
period based on a fixed adoption pattern. 
 
Data 
This section details the data used for the simulation and the probability distributions assumed 
for the specified random variables. 
Expected Increase in Yield per Hectare 
Crop yield is typically uncertain at the beginning of each cropping season. For new 
varieties, information about field trials performance can be used as a proxy for expected farm 
yields. However, there are no field trials of transgenic rice varieties in Uruguay. The 
expectations about the potential benefits of herbicide resistant transgenic rice come from reduced 
                                                 
1 The seed markup only applies for the first ten years, the legal period for patent protection in Uruguay. After year 
10, its value is zero. 
 8herbicide costs rather than yield increases (Zorrilla, 2001). Nevertheless, Oard et al. (1996) 
suggest that a better weed control can potentially increase yield, all else equal. Hence, the 
expected increase in yield is assigned a triangular probability distribution with 0, 2.5 and 5 per 
cent as minimum, most likely and maximum possible values respectively. 
Change in herbicide costs per hectare 
The study simulates a reduction in variable herbicide costs due to the substitution of a 
GMO for the actual technology used to control the most relevant rice weed (Echinochloa sp.). 
The new alternative transgenic variety is assumed to be effective with a single application of the 
herbicide to which the variety is resistant, instead of the multiple applications needed in the 
traditional technology. This approach is similar to the Round-up Ready
 technologies already on 
the market. Budget figures for rice in Uruguay show that the total cost of herbicides is 90 dollars 
per hectare, out of a total average cost for a five-year period of 1,100 dollars per hectare 
(Lavecchia, 2000; Asociación de Cultivadores de Arroz, 2001). Using Round-up Ready
 
technologies as a benchmark suggests that herbicide costs under the new technology may be set 
at 15 dollars per hectare, implying a net reduction of 75 dollars per hectare. The maximum 
herbicide costs under the new technology can be arbitrarily set at 60 dollars per hectare, 
assuming that higher values are beyond the threshold that would make farmers indifferent 
between the new and old varieties. The change in herbicide costs per hectare is therefore 
assigned a triangular distribution with 30, 75 and 90 dollars per hectare as minimum, most likely 
and maximum possible values. 
Seed premium 
The seed premium and the change in herbicide costs per hectare jointly determine the 
proportional change in variable input costs per hectare. The seed premium is the price that the 
 9owner of the gene charges above the competitive price of the seed in order to recover its research 
investments. The magnitude of the seed premium is associated with the degree of monopoly 
power in the seed market. It must be specifically accounted, since it affects the per-unit cost 
reduction that can ultimately be achieved with the new technology. Comparison with transgenic 
technologies available in the U.S for cotton and soybeans suggests that the seed premium, 
although extremely crop-specific, varies on average between 15 and 60 dollars per hectare 
(Hubbell, Marra and Carlson, 2000; Carpenter and Gianessi, 1999; Couvillion, Kari, Hudson and 
Allen, 2000). In a developing country, however, the monopolist may have lower profit margins 
or more elastic input demand. Therefore, the seed premium is assigned a triangular distribution 
with 10, 25 and 50 dollars per hectare as minimum, most likely and maximum possible values 
respectively. Since the seed premium that the monopolist is able to extract depends on the size of 
the expected reduction in herbicide costs per hectare, a positive correlation of 0.8 between both 
variables is also included in the model. 
Adoption rate 
Adoption rates are highly uncertain in ex-ante analyses and have a large influence on the 
magnitude of the change in total surplus. The difficulty in assigning an ex-ante value arises 
because many factors affect both the path of adoption of a technology over time and the 
maximum adoption rate achieved. Based on historic information for adoption of rice varieties in 
Uruguay, the adoption path over the 15-year period of the analysis is calculated assuming a 
logistic initial phase of increase, a constant maximum between years 5 and 10, and a linear 
decline after year 10 with zero per cent adoption in year 16 (Zorrilla, 2001). 
Unlike previous studies, the analysis assumes that the maximum adoption rate is 
endogenous to the model and depends on the profitability of the technology, which is represented 
 10by the estimated per-unit cost reduction. The latter is also a random variable depending, among 
others, on the expected increase in yield per hectare, the elasticity of supply, the change in 
herbicide costs per hectare and the seed markup. 
The maximum adoption rate is assigned a triangular distribution whose values are 
conditional on the per-unit cost reduction that the model previously calculates. Initial calibrations 
with the available data show that the maximum per-unit cost reduction of the model is below 15 
per cent
2. The interval between 0 and 15 per cent was then arbitrarily divided into six equal 
ranges of 2.5 points. Following the Stanford Research Institute Risk Assessment Protocol for 
expert elicitation described in Morgan and Henrion (1990), the minimum, most likely and 
maximum possible values for the maximum adoption rate under each range of per-unit cost 
reduction was elicited from the head of the Rice Research Program of the National Agriculture 
Research Institute (INIA) of Uruguay. The elicited values are shown in table 1. Then, applying 
conditional functions embedded in the spreadsheet software used to run the model, the 
simulation selects the corresponding distribution of maximum adoption rates according to the 








                                                 
2 The maximum per-unit cost reduction was initially calculated for calibration purposes applying the values of the 
variables that give the maximum expected per-unit cost reduction that can be achieved. 
 11Table 1.  Range of per-unit cost reductions and maximum expected adoption rates for 
each range (Source: elicited from Zorrilla, 2001). 
Expected Maximum Adoption Rate (% -
Triangular Distribution Values)  Range for Per-
Unit Cost 
Reduction (%)  Lowest Most  Likely  Highest 
0 – 2.5  0 2  5 
2.5 - 5  0 3  5 
5 – 7.5  3 7  20 
7.5 - 10  5 15  30 
10 – 12.5  20 40  60 
12.5 - 15  30 60  70 
 
Price 
Based on time-series data for prices received by Uruguayan rice farmers during the 
period 1981 – 1999, the price is assigned a normal distribution with mean 182.3 dollars per ton 
and standard deviation of 35.1 dollars per ton (Asociación de Cultivadores de Arroz, 2001). 
Price Elasticity of Supply 
No estimates for Uruguay were found regarding the price elasticity of supply for rice, but 
Moschini and Lapan show that the results are sensitive to the level of the price elasticity. Based 
on literature review, it is assigned a triangular distribution with minimum possible value of 0.3, 
most likely value of 1.0, and maximum possible value of 1.5. 
Deterministic variables 
All the other model parameters are assigned deterministic values. Total average rice 
costs, as explained before, are 1,100 dollars per hectare. Since the technology is assumed 
released, probability of success of the research is 100 per cent. The depreciation rate of the 
technology is assumed to be 10 per cent per year beginning in year 10 and represents, for 
 12instance, the increased resistance to herbicides that weeds acquire. Exogenous output growth is 
assumed to be 1 per cent per year. Base quantities for year 1 are 889,200 tons, calculated using 
average cropping area in Uruguay for the period 1991-2000 and average yield for the period 
1995 – 1999, net of domestic consumption (Asociación de Cultivadores de Arroz, 2001). A 
discount rate of 5 per cent is applied. The simulation was run using @Risk 3.5 for Excel, setting 
the convergence criteria to 1 per cent and selecting Latin Hypercube sampling. 
 
Results 
The results for the change in producers’ surplus, monopolist’s profit and total surplus are 
presented in table 2 for the mean, and 5 per cent and 95 per cent confidence intervals
3. 
 
Table 2.  Simulation results: change in producers’ surplus, monopolist’s profit and total 
surplus (in U.S. dollars). 
 Mean  5%  95% 
Producers’ Surplus  $ 8,118,819  $ 269,386  $ 20,315,440 
Monopolist’s Profit  $ 2,335,690  $ 117,534  $ 5,979,041 
Total Surplus  $ 10,454,510  $ 386,920  $ 26,294,481 
Producers’ %  77.66 %  69.62 %  77.26 % 
Monopolist’s %  22.34 %  30.38 %  22.74% 
 
On average, the expected change in economic surplus for rice producers is 8.1 million 
dollars for the entire period (15 years). Monopolist’s profit amounts to 2.3 million, and total 
                                                 
3The results refer to the Net Present Value (NPV) of benefits over a 15-year period. 
 13surplus change to 10.4 million dollars. These figures represent a distribution of benefits between 
producers and monopolist of 78 per cent and 22 per cent respectively. Since it is assumed that the 
monopolist extracts the profit out of the country, from Uruguayan’s point of view 78 per cent of 
the total surplus generated by the technology remains locally and 22 per cent is transferred out. 
  It is interesting to compare the total surplus generated under imperfect markets (the 
monopolist’s power) with what would have happened had the input market for the seed variety 
been perfectly competitive. Economic theory suggests that the presence of the monopolist, 
represented in the model by the seed markup, decreases the total surplus generated. The model 
was run setting the seed markup to zero to simulate a perfectly competitive market for the 
transgenic seed, and results are shown in table 3. 
 
Table 3.  Simulation results under perfectly competitive market for the transgenic seed 
change in producers’ surplus and total surplus (in U.S. dollars). 
 Mean  5%  95% 
Producers’ Surplus  $ 20,868,460  $ 4,158,791  $ 61,180,660 
Total Surplus  $ 20,868,460  $ 4,158,791  $ 61,180,660 
 
 
  Previous literature indicates that the change in the absolute size of the results comparing 
perfect and imperfect markets is not as great as the change in distribution (Alston, Sexton and 
Zhang, 1997). The present results, however, show that the absolute size may change 
considerably. The difference arises from the use of an endogenous adoption rate. Assuming 
 14perfectly competitive markets, the total surplus increases from 10.4 million to 20.8 million 
dollars. Since the gene owner is not represented any more, the increase in producers’ surplus is 
even greater, from 8.1 million to 20.8 million dollars 
  Next, the correlation coefficients are generated to identify the variables that most affect 
the total surplus change (table 4). The variables with the highest correlation with the change in 
total surplus are the expected increase in yield (0.47), the change in herbicide costs per hectare 
(0.39), and the adoption rate (0.34). It is significant that the expected increase in yield has the 
highest correlation, since it clearly makes it an important variable for the technology to be 
successful. This fact has strong implications on the appropriate strategies that should be followed 
to increase the expected benefits from a new transgenic variety. Particularly for small markets, it 
seems that gene owners would do better by introducing the technology into locally adapted 
varieties than by creating a new variety with lower yield. 
 
Table 4. Correlation coefficients of uncertain parameters with total surplus and monopolist’s 
profit. 
  Total Surplus  Monopolist’s Profit 
Expected yield increase  0.469 0.486 
Change in herbicide costs  0.39 0.51 
Adoption Rate  0.336 0.309 
Seed Premium  0.174 0.384 
Supply elasticity  - 0.414  - 0.321 
 
The positive correlations with the change in herbicide costs per hectare and with the 
adoption rate are expected. The correlation with the supply elasticity is -0.41. This arises, in part, 
 15because an increase in the supply elasticity directly reduces the per-unit cost reduction. Varying 
the mean of the distribution for the supply elasticity has a large impact on the magnitude of the 
results. For a mean of 0.5, the expected producer surplus is 12.4 million dollars, the expected 
monopolist profit is 3.1 million dollars, and the expected total surplus is 15.5 million dollars. 
When the mean of the supply elasticity is set at 1.3, the results are 7.2 million dollars for the 
producer surplus, 2.1 million dollars for the monopolist’s profit and 9.3 million dollars for the 
total surplus. Since the reason to treat the elasticity as stochastic was the lack of proper data, the 
accuracy of future work and predictions can be improved with better estimates for this variable. 
The positive sign of the correlation between the seed markup and the total surplus (0.17) is 
explained by the assumed positive correlation with the reduction in herbicide costs per hectare. 
The model allows for higher seed markup levels when reductions in herbicide costs per hectare 
are larger. Larger cost reductions produce positive changes in total surplus, which in turn imply 
that the markup can be set at a higher level. 
  The correlations between the different parameters and the monopolist’s profit are also 
indicated on table 4. As expected, the correlation of monopolist’s profits with the seed markup is 
positive and higher (0.38) than the correlation between total surplus and the seed markup. This is 
due to the direct relationship between the profits and the level of seed premium charged. The 
high correlation with the reduction in herbicide costs per hectare (0.51) is due, as before, to the 
correlation assumed between change in herbicide costs and seed markup. The high correlation 
with the expected yield increase (0.49) reconfirms the importance of the variable in determining 
the magnitude of the benefits from GMOs. The positive impact on the expected profits comes 
through the influence on the final adoption rate achieved, which for the monopolist’s has a 
 16positive correlation of 0.31. As for the total surplus, the supply elasticity is negatively correlated 
with profits (-0.32). 
  The sensitivity of the results to the level of the seed markup was examined by changing 
the mean of the distribution for the latter. The sensitivity analysis show that when the mean of 
the seed markup is changed to 35 dollars per hectare from the original level of 25, producers’ 
surplus is reduced 7.85 million dollars, monopolist’s profit remains constant at 2.32 million 
dollars and total surplus is reduced to 10.17 million dollars. When the mean of the seed markup 
is changed to 15 dollars per hectare, producers’ surplus increases to 9.94 million dollars, 
monopolist’s profit is reduced to 2.17 million dollars and total surplus increases to 12.11 million 
dollars
4. Thus, as expected, the total surplus generated decreases with the markup, while between 
$25 and $35 markups monopolists fail to increase their profits. It should be also noted that the 
assumption about the functional form of the maximum adoption rate with respect to the per-unit 
cost reduction of the new technology (see table 1) can be used to generate more drastic results. 
For example, the seed markup can be increased to a level such that one of the thresholds of 
adoption is reached, adoption rates decline sharply and total benefits are reduced more than 
proportionally with a markup. 
 
Conclusions 
According to the simulation results, the expected total change in economic surplus 
generated by the introduction of a transgenic rice variety in Uruguay is 10.4 million dollars. Out 
of the total, 8.1 million dollars (78%) correspond to producers’ and national surplus and 2.3 
million dollars (22%) are extracted out of the country as multinational firm profit. If the 
                                                 
4 The results refer to the mean of producers, monopolist and total surplus. 
 17transgenic variety were released in a perfectly competitive seed market, the expected producers’ 
and total surplus is 20.8 million dollars, with no profits for the owner of the innovation. 
The total benefits to society generated by GMOs decrease with the seed markup charged 
by the monopolist. As the monopolist increases the level of the seed premium, producer profits 
are reduced and adoption rates decline.  Producer benefits within the country are reduced. Thus, 
the profit maximizing seed mark-up for the multinational results in a lower than optimal level of 
technology adoption in the country and lower levels of total benefits. Still, monopolist profits are 
necessary to spur the large research investments needed to develop genetically modified 
varieties. The results for both producers and the monopolist provide an indication of the total size 
of returns to potential investments in a transgenic rice variety. The results suggest that, given the 
size of the market, it seems unlikely that a private company would find it profitable to invest in 
the creation of a specifically adapted transgenic variety for Uruguay. Moreover, the small market 
size and the associated relatively small pool of total benefits significantly restrict the ability of 
the country to use license fees to recover and redistribute back to producers and consumers some 
of the profits captured by multinationals. Traxler (1999) shows, however, that when conditions 
like proper law enforcement and availability of locally adapted varieties (among others) are met, 
GMO companies are willing to enter small markets. Strategic alliances between multinational 
companies and national institutions producing locally adapted varieties may increase the 
attractiveness of investments. The conclusion is further supported by the high correlation found 
between the surplus generated and the expected yield increase of the new variety, suggesting that 
the yield gains associated with local adaptability play a major role in increasing the magnitude of 
the expected benefits of a genetically modified variety.  
 18Given the limits on potential tax and tariff policies imposed on the country by small 
market size, agricultural research systems in small countries also need to examine alternative 
cost and benefit sharing arrangements with multinational gene owners.  Potential arrangements 
include shared licensing of genes introduced into locally adapted germplasm, and regional 
licenses and collaborative networks that spread national research systems and multinational’s 
fixed costs over a larger market.
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